Why Executive Power Centralizes Government

Samuel Baker ()
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Samuel Baker: Department of Economics, College of William and Mary

No 9, Working Papers from Department of Economics, College of William and Mary

Abstract: This paper examines the effects of political parties, executive power and efficiency on federal structure. It proposes and tests a model of federalism in which different levels of veto power can lead to varying degrees of centralization in the provision of central and local governmental services when executive and legislative branches have disparate preferences over which level should provide services. Results for the US (1982-1992) find state and local spending centralizes with increased veto power because, absent offsetting political party advocacy for decentralization, central government spending interests dominate local government spending interests.

Keywords: Federalism; Centralization; Political parties; Executive power; Veto (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2004-11-15, Revised 2005-06-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-geo, nep-pbe and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwm:wpaper:9

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