Value Creation in M&A Transactions, Conference Calls, and Shareholder Protection

Robert Fraunhoffer, Ho Young Kim and Dirk Schiereck

Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL) from Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute for Business Studies (BWL)

Abstract: This study investigates whether conference calls accompanying M&A announcements in Europe provide valuable information for capital market participants and hence induce an abnormal stock price revaluation on the bidder’s equity. Based on handpicked data for transactions between 2008 and 2012 we focus on the five most acquisitive country markets in Europe. Overall, our results show that bidders are more likely to conduct conference calls with increasing transaction value, for transactions with public targets and non-diversifying transactions. Further, the decision for voluntary disclosure is positively influenced by increased bidder size and the comparably weaker governance systems for German and Swiss firms. After controlling for self-selection bias and other determinants of stock returns around mergers and acquisitions (M&A) announcement, evidence is in strong support that firms with merger-related conference calls yield a higher abnormal return than firms merely publishing a press release. However, significant favourable investor reaction is only present in the UK and French subsamples and in the subsamples of industries with a focus on research and development (R&D).

Date: 2023-11-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn, nep-com and nep-sbm
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Published in International Journal of Financial Studies 1 (2023-11-21)

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https://doi.org/10.3390/ijfs6010005
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