Does Anti-Bribery Enforcement Deter Foreign Investment?

Brad Graham () and Caleb Stroup
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Brad Graham: Department of Economics, Grinnell College

No 15-04, Working Papers from Davidson College, Department of Economics

Abstract: We hand-collect data on individual FCPA enforcement actions initiated by the U.S. Department of Justice and use them in a panel difference-in-difference estimator to provide the first systematic empirical evidence that anti-bribery enforcement is followed by a reduction in U.S. fixed capital investments in countries targeted by enforcement actions. Publication Status: Published in Applied Economics Letters, 2016, 23(1):63-67.

Keywords: Foreign Corrupt Practices Act; multinational firms; cross-border mergers; foreign direct investment; anti-bribery legislation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F21 G38 K22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int and nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Does anti-bribery enforcement deter foreign investment? (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dav:wpaper:15-04

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