Endogenous Game Theoretic Deontology

Shyam Gouri Suresh and Paul Studtmann

No 19-03, Working Papers from Davidson College, Department of Economics

Abstract: We examine current approaches to modeling deontology with game theory in the context of whether the agents in those approaches are autonomous. An autonomous agent’s actions must result from her reason, not from contingent causal factors such as genetic similarity, the influence of culture, or outside causal forces. The second component of autonomy is that an autonomous agent must allow her counterparty to be autonomous as well. We propose an approach to modeling deontological reasoning where agents are autonomous in terms of both components.

Keywords: Kantian Morality; Game Theory; Deontology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A12 C79 D63 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-gth
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