The cooperative endorsement of a strategic game

Penelope Hernandez () and Jose Silva

No 610, Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour from University of Valencia, ERI-CES

Abstract: This note provides a way to translate a strategic game to a characteristic cooperative game assuming that the set of players of the cooperative game is the set of pure actions of the strategic game. Coalitions generated with only one action for each player and the total coalition characterize the Core. We calculate the worth of the total coalition to guarantee the non-emptyness condition. In particular, for a two-player game, this value is equal to the maximal sum of the diagonals.

Keywords: Cooperative games; core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
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https://www.uv.es/erices/RePEc/WP/2010/0610.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The Cooperative Endorsement of a Strategic Game (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dbe:wpaper:0610

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