The Effect of Split-Ticket Voting Cost on Electoral Enfranchisement

Germán Villegas-Bauer and Federico Juncosa

No 1991, Research Department working papers from CAF Development Bank Of Latinamerica

Abstract: The features of electoral systems can affect electoral outcomes even for fixed societal preferences. We analyze a quasi-experiment around a staggered change from a paper ballot to an electronic ballot system, which reduces the cost of split-ticket voting. A high cost to split the ticket favors straight-ticket voting, i.e., choosing the same party in all electoral races. If voters care the most about a single-seat race and if they are voting straighttickets, then the single-seat race drives the decision about which party to vote on all races. Therefore, strategic voting considerations on the single-seat race have spillovers to other races, negatively affecting small parties even in races with a proportional representation system. We show how the reduction in the cost to split the ticket increases the number of split-ticket votes and improves the performance of small parties in multiple-seat races. This results in higher political competition.

Keywords: Ciencia y tecnología; Democracia; Desarrollo institucional; Logística; Tecnologías de la información y comunicación (TIC) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dbl:dblwop:1991

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