Static Multi-Criteria Model of Investing in Innovative Projects on a Set of Coalitional Partitions

X. V. Grigorieva and Oleg A. Malafeyev

DEGIT Conference Papers from DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade

Abstract: Static multi-criteria problem of investing in innovative projects on a set of coalitional partitions finding means compromise vector (one or more) of investment programs, where each component is an investment program of the corresponding innovative project. The search of compromise vector is made under coalitional interaction of all participants in innovative projects. In the process of solving this problem several game problems with different coalitional partitions are considered. As the principles of optimality, Pareto optimum, Nash arbitration scheme, Shapley value, compromise solution are used.

Keywords: coalitional games; Pareto optimality; a compromise solution. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2011-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ppm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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