Convex and Exact Games with Non-transferable Utility

Péter Csóka, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, László Kóczy () and M. Pintér

No 31, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR)

Abstract: We generalize exactness to games with non-transferable utility (NTU). In an exact game for each coalition there is a core allocation on the boundary of its payoff set. Convex games with transferable utility are well-known to be exact. We study five generalizations of convexity in the NTU setting. We show that each of ordinal, coalition merge, individual merge and marginal convexity can be unified under NTU exactness. We provide an example of a cardinally convex game which is not NTU exact. Finally, we relate the classes of ∏-balanced, totally ∏-balanced, NTU exact, totally NTU exact, ordinally convex, cardinally convex, coalition merge convex, individual merge convex and marginal convex

JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-01-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/51480235/RM09031.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility (2011)
Working Paper: Convex and Exact Games with Non-transferable Utility (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umamet:2009031

DOI: 10.26481/umamet/2009031

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Andrea Willems () and Leonne Portz ().