EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Matching, Cooperation and HIV in the Couple

Jean-Paul Azam () and Elodie Djemai

No DT/2019/02, Working Papers from DIAL (Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation)

Abstract: We examine how cooperation within the couple protects the partners from HIV infection using survey data from Southern Africa. The respective impacts of education and cooperation on HIV risk for both wives and husbands are estimated in a joint estimation model. We fully discuss and test the con ictual approach of the couple against a cooperative framework derived from a simple matching model. Our ndings suggest that the larger the number of decisions husbands and wives jointly make, the less likely it is that they are infected with HIV. This is robust to assuming that cooperation is endogenous in the wife equation. Freedom and trust are also signi cantly related to the likelihood of infection for both partners while the women's views about whether marital violence is acceptable are not. These e ects may come from a reduced likelihood of extramarital a airs among men and women living in more cooperative partnerships.

Keywords: Couples; Matching; HIV infection; Education; Africa (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D10 I12 I26 J12 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2019-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://dial.ird.fr/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/201 ... IV-in-the-Couple.pdf First version, 2019 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Matching, Cooperation and HIV in the Couple (2019) Downloads
Working Paper: Matching, cooperation and HIV in the couple (2019)
Working Paper: Matching, cooperation and HIV in the couple (2019) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dia:wpaper:dt201902

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from DIAL (Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Loic Le Pezennec ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-22
Handle: RePEc:dia:wpaper:dt201902