Immigration and crime: the role of self-selection and institutions

Fabio Mariani (fabio.mariani@uclouvain.be) and Marion Mercier

No DT/2019/14, Working Papers from DIAL (Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation)

Abstract: Contrarily to popular perception, empirical evidence suggests that immigrants do not commit more crimes than natives, in spite of having lower legitimate earning opportunities. To make sense of this, we propose a novel theoretical framework based on a predator/prey model of crime, where endogenous migration decisions and career choices (between licit and illicit activities) are jointly determined. In this setting, we show that the involvement of migrants in crime crucially depends on self-selection into migration, as well as productivity and institutional quality in the host economy. We also nd that stricter immigration policies may induce an adverse selection of migrants, and eventually attract more foreign-born criminals. Finally, a dynamic extension of our model can account for the higher crime rates of second-generation immigrants and, based on the interplay between crime and institutions, highlights the critical role of immigration and assimilation for the long-run evolution of crime and the rule-of-law in host countries.

Keywords: Migration; Crime. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F22 K42 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2019-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int, nep-law, nep-mig and nep-ure
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https://dial.ird.fr/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/201 ... and-institutions.pdf First version, 2019 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Immigration and crime: The role of self-selection and institutions (2021)
Working Paper: Immigration and crime: the role of self-selection and institutions (2021)
Working Paper: Immigration and Crime: The Role of Self-Selection and Institutions (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dia:wpaper:dt201914

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