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Accordi, regole sociali, giudici e tribunali Parte II

Carlo Beretta ()

No dis1502, DISEIS - Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo from Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo (DISEIS)

Abstract: Starting with a prisoner’s dilemma, a simple taxonomy of the possible characteristics of a game is introduced. This forms the basis for discussing repeated interactions and the emergence of personalised rules used in durable relationships. When by their nature, interactions are sporadic, much of the same results can be obtained by the use of social rules. Finally, the use of formal contracts, typically incomplete, and a third party to solve conflicts is outlined. The Appendix contains a summary introduction to the problem of incompleteness of norm systems

JEL-codes: A1 C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dis:wpaper:dis1502

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