Being in Someone Else's Shoes. Order of play and non-zero equilibria in the ultimatum game

Mario Maggioni and Domenico Rossignoli

No dis2203, DISEIS - Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo from Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo (DISEIS)

Abstract: In this paper, we devise a randomized experiment to test whether the order of play in two Ultimatum Games influences the choice of players, using a sample of a thousand individuals representative of the entire Italian adult population. We find that, in the second game, Proposers increase the average share sent and Respondents reduce the minimum acceptable offer. Both effects increase the probability of reaching a nonzero equilibrium. Given that no result is known to the player during the games, we suggest a role for a raised awareness of the partner's preferences, preferred outcomes, and strategies in influencing the subject's behavior, and consequently the game's equilibria, in the second game.

JEL-codes: C91 D83 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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