Candidate Stable Voting Rules for Separable Orderings

Kentaro Hatsumi

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: We consider the election model in which voters choose a subset from the set of candidates. Both voters and candidates are assumed to possess preferences with separable strict orderings. We investigate a rule satisfying candidate stability, which is the requirement to deter any candidate from strategic withdrawal. We show that a rule satisfies candidate stability if and only if it satisfies independence of the selection for each candidate.

Date: 2009-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0735

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