Reserve Price When Bidders are Asymmetric

Hikmet Gunay, Xin Meng and Mark Nagelberg

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: We analyze the optimal reserve price in a second price auction when there are N types of bidders whose valuations are drawn from different distribution functions. The seller cannot determine the specific type of each bidder. First, we show that the number of bidders affects the reserve price. Second, we give

Date: 2012-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-mic
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https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/static/resources/docs/dp/2012/DP0849.pdf

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Working Paper: Reserve price when bidders are asymmetric (2013)
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