Who benefits from resale-below-cost laws?
Noriaki Matsushima and
Akira Miyaoka
ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Abstract:
We investigate the effect of banning resale-below-cost offers. There are two retailers with heterogeneous bargaining positions in relation to a monopolistic manufacturer. Each retailer sells two goods: one procured from the monopolistic manufacturer and the other, from a competitive fringe. In equilibrium, banning resale-below-cost offers can decrease the retailers' prices. The ban can benefit the weak retailer in terms of bargaining position and increase the total consumer surplus, although it harms the dominant retailer and the monopolistic manufacturer. Contrary to the basic scenario, when the weak retailer is horizontally separated, the ban benefits the monopolistic manufacturer.
Date: 2013-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0875
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