Strategy-Proofness on Bankruptcy Problems with an Indivisible Object

Kazuhiko Hashimoto and Yu Nakayama

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: We analyze bankruptcy problems with an indivisible object, where real owners and outside traders want to allocate an indivisible object among them with monetary compensation. The object might be a company that has gone bankrupt or a house left by a parent who has died, and so on. We show that there exists no rule satisfying strategy-proofness and the ownership lower bound on any domains that include at least three common preferences.

Date: 2016-02
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0961

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