Naked exclusion under exclusive-offer competition

Hiroshi Kitamura, Noriaki Matsushima and Misato Sato

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: This study constructs a model of anticompetitive exclusive-offer competition between two existing upstream firms. Under exclusive-offer competition, the upstream firm's profit depends on the rival's exclusive offer. If the rival makes an exclusive offer acceptable for the downstream firm, the upstream firm is excluded unless it succeeds in exclusion. Consequently, the upper bound of exclusive offers becomes higher than when one of the upstream firms is a potential entrant that cannot make any exclusive offer. Thus, the exclusion of the existing upstream firm can be an equilibrium outcome even in the case where the potential entrant is never excluded.

Date: 2018-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Naked Exclusion under Exclusive-offer Competition (2025)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1021

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