A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule in Object Allocation Problem for an Arbitrary Number of Objects

Ryosuke Sakai and Shigehiro Serizawa

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation rules satisfying individual rationality, no subsidy, efficiency, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Morimoto and Serizawa (2015), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is characterized by the four properties on the classical domain.

Date: 2021-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-isf and nep-ore
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1134

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