An Experiment on Demand Commitment Bargaining

Michela Chessa, Nobuyuki Hanaki, Aymeric Lardon and Takashi Yamada

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: In this experiment, we compare three implementations of the Winter demand commitment bargaining mechanism: a one-period implementation, a two-period implementation with low delay costs, and a two-period implementation with high delay costs. Despite the different theoretical predictions, our results show that the three different implementations result in similar outcomes in all our investigation domains: namely, coalition formation, alignment with the Shapley value prediction, and satisfaction of the axioms. Our results suggest that a lighter bargaining implementation with only one period is often sufficient in providing allocations that sustain the Shapley value as an appropriate cooperative solution concept, while saving unnecessary time and resource costs.

Date: 2021-12, Revised 2022-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: An Experiment on Demand Commitment Bargaining (2023)
Working Paper: An Experiment on Demand Commitment Bargaining (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1152r

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