An Experiment on the Nash Program: A Comparison of Two Strategic Mechanisms Implementing the Shapley Value

Michela Chessa, Nobuyuki Hanaki, Aymeric Lardon and Takashi Yamada

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Date: 2022-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value (2023)
Working Paper: An Experiment on The Nash Program: A Comparison of Two Strategic Mechanisms Implementing the Shapley Value (2023)
Working Paper: An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1175

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