Characterizing pairwise strategy-proof rules in object allocation problems with money

Hiroki Shinozaki

ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka

Abstract: We consider the problem of allocating a single object to the agents with payments.

Date: 2022-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1187

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