Learning by litigating: An application to antitrust commitments

Andreea Cosnita-Langlais and Jean-Philippe Tropeano

No 2021-37, EconomiX Working Papers from University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX

Abstract: This paper examines the impact of commitment decisions on the efficiency of antitrust enforcement. We discuss the optimal use of commitments considering past rulings as a source of knowledge to better assess future similar antitrust cases. Our framework combines two key effects: the deterrence of the anticompetitive behavior by the different enforcement regimes, and the dynamic perspective through litigation as a source of learning. We show that if the level of penalty is high enough, the antitrust authorities undervalue the dynamic informational benefit of litigation and tend to over-use commitments.

Keywords: antitrust; commitments; deterrence; legal learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 K21 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-law and nep-reg
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https://economix.fr/pdf/dt/2021/WP_EcoX_2021-37.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Learning by litigating: An application to antitrust commitments (2022)
Working Paper: Learning by Litigation:An Application to Antitrust Commitments (2022)
Working Paper: Learning by litigating: An application to antitrust commitments (2022)
Working Paper: Learning by litigating: An application to antitrust commitments (2022)
Working Paper: Learning by litigating: An application to antitrust commitments (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:drm:wpaper:2021-37

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