Supplement to “Foundations for Cooperation in the Prisoners’ Dilemma”

Brendan Daley and Philipp Sadowski

No 13-18, Working Papers from Duke University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We establish that in the Prisoners’ Dilemma, the model of Daley and Sadowski (2013) is logically distinct from three models that employ well-known forms of other regarding preferences - altruism (Ledyard, 1995; Levine, 1998), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), and reciprocity (Rabin, 1993).

Pages: 6
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-exp
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