Voting and turning out for monetary integration: the case of the French referendum on the Maastricht treaty

Pierre-Guillaume Méon

No 05-02.RS, DULBEA Working Papers from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: This paper analyses the voting and abstention patterns in French departments in the 1992 referendum on the Maastricht treaty, in light of the potential impact of monetary union. We observe that departmental characteristics implying either greater benefits or lower costs from monetary union are significantly correlated with the approval rate. This supports the view that the voting behavior of individual agents depended on their self-interest. The impact of economic characteristics on the abstention rate is less clear. Indeed, the variable that is most significantly correlated with abstention in the referendum is average abstention in other elections.

Keywords: Monetary union; referendum; voting; abstention (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 F02 F33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 p.
Date: 2005-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mon
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published by: DULBEA - Université libre de Bruxelles, Bruxelles

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Related works:
Journal Article: Voting and turning out for monetary integration: the case of the French referendum on the Maastricht treaty (2009)
Working Paper: Voting and turning out for monetary integration: the case of the French referendum on the Maastricht treaty (2009)
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