Coordination in Teams: A Real Effort-task Experiment with Informal Punishment

Radu Vranceanu, Fouad El Ouardighi () and Delphine Dubart ()
Additional contact information
Fouad El Ouardighi: ESSEC Business School, Postal: Avenue Bernard Hirsch, B.P. 50105, 95021 CERGY-PONTOISE Cedex, FRANCE,, http://www.essec.edu
Delphine Dubart : ESSEC Business School, Postal: Avenue Bernard Hirsch, B.P. 50105, 95021 CERGY-PONTOISE Cedex, FRANCE,, http://www.essec.edu

No WP1310, ESSEC Working Papers from ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School

Abstract: This paper reports the results from a real-effort team production experiment, where best performers can impose either tacit or explicit sanctions on their less-performing partners. The behavior of the best performer in the team differs from one condition to another. When explicit sanctions are not allowed, good performers reduce their effort in response to the advantageous difference in scores; when they can impose sanctions, their change in effort is no longer related to the difference in scores. To some extent, a mechanism of explicit sanctions allows good performers to focus on their own performance. Not sanctioning an opponent who under-performs, what we refer to as forgiveness, prompts the latter to improve his performance, but applying the sanction has a stronger effect.

Keywords: Team work; Performance; Experimental economics; Punishment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D03 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2013-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-hrm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hal-essec.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/85/73/64/PDF/WP1310.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Coordination in Teams: A Real Effort-task Experiment with Informal Punishment (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-13010

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ESSEC Working Papers from ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School ESSEC Research Center, BP 105, 95021 Cergy, France. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sophie Magnanou ().