Experimental Evidence on Gender Interaction in Lying Behavior

SeEun Jung () and Radu Vranceanu

No WP1514, ESSEC Working Papers from ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School

Abstract: The paper reports results from an Ultimatum Game experiment with asymmetric information where Proposers can send to Responders misleading information about their endowment. We allow for all possible gender combinations in the Proposer-Responder pairs. Proposer messages that underestimate the actual amount are quite widespread. The frequency of lying is slightly higher in mixed groups. Conditional on lying, men tend to state bigger lies than women. On the other hand, women tend to tell smaller lies when paired with men, than when paired with women. In general, women present higher acceptance rates than men.

Keywords: Gender studies; Ultimatum Game; Asymmetric information; Lies; Extensive vs. intensive margin (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D83 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2015-08, Revised 2015-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Experimental Evidence on Gender Interaction in Lying Behavior (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-15014

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