EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Discontent with taxes and the timing of taxation: experimental evidence

Radu Vranceanu, Angela Sutan and Delphine Dubart ()
Additional contact information
Delphine Dubart: Essec Business School

No WP1602, ESSEC Working Papers from ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School

Abstract: This paper reports results from a linear sanction cost variant of the power-to-take game, with implications for tax policies. We compare a pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) system with an ex-post taxation system in which payroll taxes are collected at the end of the fiscal year. Dissatisfaction with taxation, as proxied by the sanction in the power-to-take game, is significantly higher in an ex-post taxation system compared with the PAYE system. However, in anticipation of the higher sanction, the "tax authority" will not apply lower taxes in the former system. Communication does not decrease dissatisfaction in a significant manner, and it is not used extensively by participants.

Keywords: Power-to-take game; Experiments; Tax systems; Dissatisfaction with taxes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D01 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2016-03-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-pbe, nep-pke and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal-essec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01282724/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Discontent with taxes and the timing of taxation: experimental evidence (2019) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-16002

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ESSEC Working Papers from ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School ESSEC Research Center, BP 105, 95021 Cergy, France. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sophie Magnanou ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-30
Handle: RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-16002