An equilibrium search model of the French dual market for medical services

Damien Besancenot and Radu Vranceanu

No WP1709, ESSEC Working Papers from ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School

Abstract: The French market for specialist physician care has a dual structure, including a sector 1 with regulated fees, and a sector 2 where physicians can freely choose fees. Patients who undergo a sequential search process for the best medical o¤er develop a reservation fee decision rule. We analyzed physicians decisions to work in sector 1 or in sector 2, and their choice of fee in sector 2. The model features several pure strategy equilibria that can be ordered with respect to patient welfare. Policy implications follow.

Keywords: Equilibrium search; Medical fee dispersion; Dual market; Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 I11 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2017-06-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-hea
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: An equilibrium search model of the French dual market for medical services (2017)
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