Profession and deception: Experimental evidence on lying behavior among business and medical students

Damien Besancenot and Radu Vranceanu

No WP2006, ESSEC Working Papers from ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School

Abstract: This paper reports data from a sender-receiver experiment that compares lying behavior between two groups of students, one in business administration and the other in medicine. We use a modified version of the sender-receiver deception game introduced by Erat and Gneezy (2012) to collect data on 393 subjects. The results show that both groups of students respond to incentives as expected: the frequency of lying is higher, the higher the benefit for the sender, and the lower the loss for the receiver is. For given payoffs, there is little difference between the two groups in the domain of white lies; however, business students resort to selfish lies more frequently than do medical students. Furthermore, the analysis does not confirm differences in altruism between the two groups

Keywords: Lies; deception; communication; medicine; business administration; survey data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D83 I19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2020-09-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Note: This is the preprint version of the paper published in the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2020, with DOI.ORG/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.08.47
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Profession and deception: Experimental evidence on lying behavior among business and medical students (2020)
Working Paper: Profession and deception: Experimental evidence on lying behavior among business and medical students (2020)
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