Belief-free Equilibria in games with incomplete information

Stefano Lovo and Johanes Hörner ()

No 845, HEC Research Papers Series from HEC Paris

Abstract: In this paper, the authors define belief-free equilibria in two-player games with incomplete information as sequential equilibria for which players’ continuation strategies are best-replies, after every history, independently of their beliefs about the state of nature. They characterize a set of payoffs that includes all belief-free equilibrium payoffs. Conversely, any payoff in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff.

Keywords: game theory; equilibria; information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2006-05-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fmk and nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information (2009)
Working Paper: Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information (2009)
Working Paper: Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information (2007)
Working Paper: Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:heccah:0845

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