Basel II and the Value of Bank Differentiation

Ulrich Hege and Eberhard Feess ()

No 879, HEC Research Papers Series from HEC Paris

Abstract: This paper analyzes optimal bank capital requirements when regulation can be differentiated according to banks’ heterogeneous risk-assessment capabilities. The new Basel II Accord provides the opportunity to do by introducing distinct regulatory systems for banks authorized to apply internal ratings and externally rated banks.

Keywords: bank capital regulation; capital adequacy; bank competition; risk-taking; Basel Accord; internal ratings (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H41 K13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2007-10-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-fmk, nep-law, nep-reg and nep-rmg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Basel II and the Value of Bank Differentiation (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:heccah:0879

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