Markov Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Revision Games

Stefano Lovo and Tristan Tomala

No 1093, HEC Research Papers Series from HEC Paris

Abstract: We introduce the model of Stochastic Revision Games where a finite set of players control a state variable and receive payoffs as a function of the state at a terminal deadline. There is a Poisson clock which dictates when players are called to choose of revise their actions. This paper studies the existence of Markov perfect equilibria in those games. We give an existence proof assuming some form of correlation.

Keywords: Stochastic Revision Games; Games Theory; Equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2015-09-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-ore
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Markov Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Revision Games (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:heccah:1093

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