How Much Better Is Better Regulation? Assessing the Impact of the Better Regulation Package on the European Union – A Research Agenda

Alberto Alemanno ()

No 1119, HEC Research Papers Series from HEC Paris

Abstract: Emboldened by the Spitzenkandidaten process, the new European Commission emerges as the most political yet. The Commission asks EU citizens to judge its operation by its ability ‘to deliver solutions to the big issues that cannot be addressed by the Member States alone’. The Better Regulation Package translates this political commitment into an actionable approach assuring EU citizens that the Commission will remain ‘big on big things, small on small things’. To deliver on this promise, the Commission extends the Impact Assessment system, renews its consultation procedures and adds a few institutional mechanisms so as to enhance its ‘ability to deliver’ throughout the policy cycle. But in order to do so the Commission needs to bind – and somehow control – the European Parliament and the Council, on the one hand, and the Member States, on the other, in relation to their commitment to openness, participation and evidence-based policymaking. While legitimate, this attempt raises serious doubts about the compatibility of this reform with the principle of separation of powers and, in particular, that of institutional balance.

Keywords: Regulatory reform; Better Regulation; Regulatory Scrutiny Board; Impact Assessment; REFIT; CBA; comparative institutional analysis; trilogues; trialogues; TTIP (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K30 K32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2015-10-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:heccah:1119

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