Multinational Banks and Supranational Supervision
Jean-Edouard Colliard,
Giacomo Calzolari () and
Gyongyi Loranth ()
No 1152, HEC Research Papers Series from HEC Paris
Abstract:
We study the supervision of multinational banks (MNBs), allowing for either national or supranational supervision. National supervision leads to insufficient monitoring of MNBs due to a coordination problem between supervisors. Supranational supervision can solve this problem and increase monitoring. However, this change has the unintended consequence of affecting the MNB's choice of foreign representation. MNBs may expand abroad using branches rather than subsidiaries, or abandon foreign expansion altogether. These changes completely neutralize the more intense monitoring that would otherwise occur with supranational supervision. Our paper provides insight into how the national boundaries of bank supervision interact with multinational banks.
Keywords: Cross-Border Banks; Multinational banks; Supervision; Monitoring; Regulation; Banking Union (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F23 G21 G28 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 57 pages
Date: 2017-01-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2769219 (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Multinational Banks and Supranational Supervision (2019) 
Working Paper: Multinational Banks and Supranational Supervision (2016) 
Working Paper: Multinational Banks and Supranational Supervision (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:heccah:1152
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