Persuasion with Limited Communication Capacity

Maël Le Treust () and Tristan Tomala

No 1244, HEC Research Papers Series from HEC Paris

Abstract: We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where the persuader and the decision maker communicate through an imperfect channel which has a fixed and limited number of messages and is subject to exogenous noise. Imperfect communication entails a loss of payoff for the persuader. We establish an upper bound on the payoffs the persuader can secure by communicating through the channel. We also show that the bound is tight: if the persuasion problem consists of a large number of independent copies of the same base problem, then the persuader can achieve this bound arbitrarily closely by using strategies which tie all the problems together. We characterize this optimal payoff as a function of the information-theoretic capacity of the communication channel.

Keywords: Bayesian persuasion problem; imperfect communication channel (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 64 pages
Date: 2017-12-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3083932 Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Persuasion with limited communication capacity (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:heccah:1244

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3083932

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in HEC Research Papers Series from HEC Paris HEC Paris, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas cedex, France. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Antoine Haldemann ().