Strategic Sophistication and Attention in Games: an Eye-Tracking Study

Luca Polonio, Sibilla Di Guida and Giorgio Coricelli ()

Working Papers ECARES from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: We used eye-tracking to measure the dynamic patterns of visual information acquisition in twoplayers normal form games. Participants played one-shot games in which either, neither, or only oneof the players had a dominant strategy. First, we performed a mixture models cluster analysis to groupparticipants into types according to the pattern of visual information acquisition observed in a singleclass of games. Then, we predicted agents’ choices in different classes of games, and observed thatpatterns of visual information acquisition were game invariant. Our method allowed us to predictwhether the decision process would lead to equilibrium choices or not, and to attribute out-ofequilibriumresponses to limited cognitive capacities or social motives. Our results suggest theexistence of individually heterogeneous-but stable-patterns of visual information acquisition basedon subjective levels of strategic sophistication and social preferences.

Keywords: game theory; strategic sophistication; social preferences; attention; eye-tracking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 p.
Date: 2014-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-neu
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Journal Article: Strategic sophistication and attention in games: An eye-tracking study (2015)
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