Patent office Governance and Patent System Quality

Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potter (bruno.vanpottelsberghe@uni-corvinus.hu) and Pierre Picard

Working Papers ECARES from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Abstract: The present paper discusses the role of quality in patent systems from the perspective of patent offices'behavior and organization. After documenting original stylized facts, the paper presents a model in which patent offices set patent fees and the quality level of their examination processes. Various objectives of patent offices' governors are considered. We show that the quality of the patent system is maximal for the patent offices that maximises either the social welfare or its own profit. Quality is lower for the self-funded patent office maximizing the number of patent applications and even smaller for the self-funded patent office maximizing the number of granted patents. A labor union improves examination quality and may compensate for the potentialy inappropriate objectives of patent office management.

Keywords: Patent system; Quality; intellectual property; Public firm organization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L30 O30 O31 O34 O38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino, nep-ipr and nep-pr~
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/8235 ... GHE-patentoffice.pdf 2011-007-PICARD_VANPOTTELSBERGHE-patentoffice (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Patent office governance and patent system quality (2011)
Working Paper: Patent Office Governance and Patent System Quality (2011)
Working Paper: Patent Office Governance and Patent System Quality (2011)
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