Strategic Analysis of Influence Peddling

Mukul Majumdar and Seung Han Yoo
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Mukul Majumdar: Cornell University
Seung Han Yoo: Nanyang Technological University

Working Papers from Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics

Abstract: This paper analyzes "Influence Peddling" with interaction between human capital transfer and collusion-building aspects in a model, in which each government official regulates multiple firms simultaneously. We show that (i) there exists an "optimal" division rule for collusion between a sequence of "qualified" regulators and a firm; (ii) as the regulators increasingly benefit from the collusion, they strictly decrease regulation rates for the firm under collusion while strictly increasing regulation rates for a firm not under collusion; and (iii) post-government-employment restrictions are not "effective" policies, and an alternative policy can be suggested.

JEL-codes: D73 H83 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-reg
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https://cae.economics.cornell.edu/11.04.pdf

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:corcae:11-04

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