Technological Innovation and Monopolization
F. M. Scherer
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F. M. Scherer: Harvard U
Working Paper Series from Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government
Abstract:
This paper, written for an American Bar Association compendium on competition policy, reviews seven of the most important U.S. antitrust cases charging firms in high-technology industries with violations of Sherman Act Section II -- i.e., with monopolization. The principal target firms were Standard Oil of New Jersey, General Electric (in lamps), AT&T, du Pont (for cellophane), Xerox, IBM, and Microsoft (both in the United States and Europe). From an analysis of the historical records, it is clear that in most instances, the legal system took far too long to deal with the contested issues. In the interim, firms that had achieved dominant positions through innovation often embraced new technologies slowly, sometimes pursuing an explicit "fast second" strategy -- that is, waiting to innovate until their positions were threatened by outsiders. The stimulating effect of outside challenges suggests that entry should be kept open, among other things by combating the extension over time of blocking patent positions. Procedural reforms for accelerating the adjudication of complaints are proposed.
Date: 2007-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~, nep-mic and nep-tid
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp07-043
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