EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Getting Past No: Gender and the Propensity to Persist in Negotiation

Hannah Riley Bowles and Francis J. Flynn
Additional contact information
Hannah Riley Bowles: Harvard U
Francis J. Flynn: Stanford U

Working Paper Series from Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government

Abstract: Gender stereotypes suggest that men will persist more in negotiation than women, particularly in mixed-gender pairs. In contrast, a gender-in-context perspective suggests that women will vary their persistence behavior more than men and become more rather than less persistent in mixed-gender pairs in order to resist male dominance in negotiation. Results of three studies support the gender-in-context perspective, showing that women vary the degree and quality of their persistence behavior more than men depending on their counterpart’s gender. Women became more persistent with male than female negotiating counterparts (Studies 1-3). Consistent with the proposition that women persist more with men than women out of resistance to stereotypical male dominance in negotiation, women relied on characteristically low-status forms of influence (more indirect than direct) when persisting with men but not women (Study 3) and women’s extra persistence with male counterparts helped them reduce the gender gap in negotiation performance (Study 3).

Date: 2007-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp07-063

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Series from Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-30
Handle: RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp07-063