Access Pricing, Competition, and Incentives to Migrate from "Old" to "New" Technology

Marc Bourreau, Carlo Cambini and Pinar Dogan ()
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Carlo Cambini: Polytechnic University of Turin

Working Paper Series from Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government

Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the incentives of an incumbent and an entrant to migrate from an "old" technology to a "new" technology, and discuss how the terms of wholesale access affect this migration. We show that a higher access charge on the legacy network pushes the entrant firm to invest more, but has an ambiguous effect on the incumbent's investments, due to two conflicting effects: the wholesale revenue effect, and the business migration effect. If both the old and the new infrastructures are subject to ex-ante access regulation, we also find that the two access charges are positively correlated.

JEL-codes: L51 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-net and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/work ... ?PubId=7904&type=WPN

Related works:
Journal Article: Access pricing, competition, and incentives to migrate from “old” to “new” technology (2012)
Working Paper: Access pricing, competition, and incentives to migrate from “old” to “new” technology (2012)
Working Paper: Access Pricing, Competition, and Incentives to Migrate From "Old" to "New" Technology (2011)
Working Paper: Access Pricing, Competition, and Incentives to Migrate From "Old" to "New" Technology
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp11-029

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