A Note on Stability in One-to-One, Multi-period Matching Markets

Maciej Kotowski

Working Paper Series from Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government

Abstract: We introduce a new stability concept for multi-period matching markets. Robust prescient stability asserts that agents exhibit foresight concerning how a market can develop in the future, but they retain ambiguity concerning how the market will develop. We show that a robustly presciently stable matching exists for any configuration of agents' preferences.

JEL-codes: C71 C78 D90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp15-042

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