Sequential Voting with Abstention

Marco Battaglini

Papers from Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy

Abstract: Dekel and Piccione (2000) have proven that information cascades do not necessarily affect the properties of information aggregation in sequential elections: under standard conditions, any symmetric equilibrium of a simultaneous voting mechanism is also an equilibrium of the correspondent sequential mechanism. We show that when voters can abstain, these results are sensitive to the introduction of an arbitrarily small cost of voting: the set of equilibria in the two mechanisms are generally disjoint; and the informative properties of the equilibrium sets can be ranked. If an appropriate q-rule is chosen, when the cost of voting is small the unique symmetric equilibrium of the simultaneous voting mechanism dominates all equilibria of the sequential mechanism.

JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.princeton.edu/~mbattagl/seqvot.pdf
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
Journal Article: Sequential voting with abstention (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:prirpe:05-19-2004

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().