Legislative and Multilateral Bargaining

Hulya Eraslan and Kirill Evdokimov
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Hulya Eraslan: Rice U

Working Papers from Rice University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This survey of the theoretical literature on legislative and multilateral bargaining begins with the seminal work of Baron and Ferejohn (1989). The survey then encompasses the extensions to bargaining among asymmetric players in terms of bargaining power, voting weights, and time and risk preferences; spatial bargaining; bargaining over a stochastic surplus; bargaining over public goods; legislative bargaining with alternative bargaining protocols in which players make demands, compete for recognition, or make counter-proposals; and legislative bargaining with cheap talk communication.

Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:riceco:19-007

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