Core Rationalizability in Two-Agent Exchange Economies

Walter Bossert and Yves Sprumont ()

Working Papers from Rice University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We provide a characterization of selection correspondences in two-person exchange economies that can be core rationalized in the sense that there exists a preference profile with some standard properties that generates the observed choices as the set of core elements of the economy for any given initial endowment vector. The approach followed in this paper deviates from the standard rational choice model in that a rationalization in terms of a profile of individual orderings rather than in terms of a single individual or social preference relation is analyzed.

JEL-codes: D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~econ/papers/2000papers/07Bossert.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Core rationalizability in two-agent exchange economies (2002)
Working Paper: Core Retionalizability in Two-Agent Exchange Economies (2000)
Working Paper: Core Retionalizability in Two-Agent Exchange Economies (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:riceco:2000-07

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