Fairness and Reflexivity in the Cyprus Bail-In

Stavros Zenios

Working Papers from University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center

Abstract: The Cyprus debt crisis provides some unique lessons on crisis management. By the time an assistance program was agreed with the Troika, the problem had become so complex that a depositor bail-in was implemented. This was a policy first for Eurozone and is now becoming a blueprint for dealing with future banking crises. This paper examines the events for the one-year period before the two eurogroup meetings on Cyprus on 17 and 25 March 2013 and the resulting resolution of the two systemic banks of the country with depositor bail-in. We show how delays in dealing with the crisis exacerbated the problem but also how the tools brought in to solve the problem created significant adverse side effects. Available evidence questions the validity of confidential studies guiding the policy decisions on depositor haircut and argues that the implemented bail-in violated international principles of fairness.

JEL-codes: E32 E44 E63 F32 F34 G33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-ger and nep-mac
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:upafin:14-04

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