Elicited beliefs and social information in modified dictator games: What do dictators believe other dictators do?

Nagore Iriberri and Pedro Rey‐Biel
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Pedro Rey-Biel

Quantitative Economics, 2013, vol. 4, issue 3, 515-547

Date: 2013
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Working Paper: Elicited beliefs and social information in modified dictator games: What do dictators believe other dictators do? (2009)
Working Paper: Elicited Beliefs and Social Information in Modified Dictator Games: What Do Dictators Believe Other Dictators Do?
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