Electoral Competition in 2-Dimensional Ideology Space with Unidimensional Commitment

Marcin Dziubiński () and Jaideep Roy

CEDI Discussion Paper Series from Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University

Abstract: We study a model of political competition between two candidates with two orthogonal issues, where candidates are office motivated and committed to a particular position in one of the dimensions, while having the freedom to slect (credibly) any position on the other dimension. We analyse two settings: a homogeneous one, where both candidates are committed to the same dimension and a heterogeneous one, where each candidate is committed to a different dimension. We characterise and give necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of convergent and divergent Nash equilibria for distributions with a non-empty and an empty core. We identify a special point on the ideology space whcih we call a strict median, existence of which is strictly related to existence of divergent Nash equilibria. A central conclusion of our anlysis is that for divergent equilibria, strong extremism (or differentiation) seems to be an important equlibrium feature.

Pages: 51 pages
Date: 2008-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Related works:
Journal Article: Electoral competition in 2-dimensional ideology space with unidimensional commitment (2011)
Working Paper: Electoral Competition in 2-Dimensional Ideology Space with Unidimensional Commitment (2009)
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