Games with Capacity Manipulation: Incentives and Nash Equilibria

Antonio Romero-Medina and Matteo Triossi
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina

No 280, Documentos de Trabajo from Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile

Abstract: Studying the interaction between preference and capacity manipulation in matching markets, we prove that acyclicity is a necessary and su!cient condition that guarantees the stability of a Nash equilibrium and the strategy-proofness of truthful capacity revelation under the hospital-optimal and intern-optimal stable rules. we then introduce generalized capacity manipulations games where hospitals move first and state their capacities, and interns are subsequently assigned to hospitals using a sequential mechanism. In this setting, we first consider stable revelation mechanisms and introduce conditions guaranteeing the stability of the outcome. Next, we prove that every stable non-revelation mechanism leads to unstable allocations, unless restrictions on the preferences of the agents are introduced. JEL Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D71, D78.

Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cea-uchile.cl/wp-content/uploads/doctrab/ASOCFILE120110822084251.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria (2013)
Working Paper: Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria (2011)
Working Paper: Games of Capacities: A (Close) Look to Nash Equilibria (2007)
Working Paper: Games of capacities: a (close) look to Nash Equilibria (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:edj:ceauch:280

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Documentos de Trabajo from Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().