Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets

Antonio Romero-Medina and Matteo Triossi
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina

No 328, Documentos de Trabajo from Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile

Abstract: We study a class of sequential non-revelation mechanisms where hospitals make simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it o?ers to doctors that either accept or reject them. We show that the mechanisms in this class are equivalent. They (weakly) implement the set of stable allocations in subgame perfect equilibrium. When all preferences are substitutable, the set of equilibria of the mechanisms in the class forms a lattice. Our results reveal a first-mover advantage absent in the model without contracts. We apply our findings to centralize school admissions problems, and we show obtaining pairwise stable allocations is possible through the immediate acceptance mechanism.Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D78. Key words: Keywords: Many-to-many, contracts, ultimatum games.

Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets (2023)
Working Paper: Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:edj:ceauch:328

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